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All science is cosmology, I believe. 
 
        Sir Karl Popper 
 
To search thoroughly for the truth involves a searching 
of souls as well as of spectra. 
 
       Georges Lemaître 
 
 
Abstract. A recent criticism of cosmological methodology and achievements by Disney 
(2000) is assessed. Some historical and epistemological fallacies in the said article have been 
highlighted. It is shown that—both empirically and epistemologically—modern cosmology 
lies on sounder foundations than it is portrayed. A brief historical account demonstrates that 
this form of unsatisfaction with cosmology has had a long tradition, and rather meagre results 
in the course of the XX century. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In a recent intriguing and provocative paper, Disney (2000) has suggested that our 
cosmological knowledge and contingent claims are “overblown”, as well as “naïve in the 
extreme”, “doing a disservice”, etc. There are other recent instances of similar criticism being 
expressed at scientific conferences, publications and informal debates. It is the purpose of this 
essay to show that such criticism—although certainly not unwelcome—is not completely fair, 
it does leave several important facts and issues out of the picture, and that it is not particularly 
new or original. These considerations dictate the division of the presented material: after we 
consider criticisms of the empirical basis of modern cosmology (Section 2), we shall tackle 
the deeper issues of the epistemological foundations of the contemporary cosmological work 
(Section 3). Before concluding this reply, we shall demonstrate that Disney’s criticisms are 
mainly rehashed versions of the arguments appearing already several times in the history of 
the XX-century science.   
 The immediate motivation for the Disney's critique is the claim in the recent paper of 
Hu, Sugiyama and Silk (1997) to the effect that with the information to be supplied by the 
new generation of the cosmic microwave background (henceforth CMB) satellite 
observatories we shall be able to put the standard Big Bang cosmological model on the same 
 2 
epistemological level as the Standard Model of particle physics. Creating a controversy out of 
such optimistic view, Disney pronounces: 
 
We believe the most charitable thing that can be said of such statements is 
that they are naive in the extreme and betray a complete lack of 
understanding of history, of the huge difference between an observational 
and an experimental science, and of the peculiar limitations of cosmology as 
a scientific discipline. By building up expectations that cannot be realised, 
such statements do a disservice not only to astronomy and to particle 
physics but they could ultimately do harm to the wider respect in which the 
whole scientific approach is held. As such, they must not go unchallenged.  
 
In the further course of this note, we shall show that it is exactly such broad criticism of 
cosmology articulated by Disney which is rather naive and which demonstrates a lack of 
understanding of history of science. Furthermore, one can easily show that the very essence of 
such criticism is almost verbatim repetition of various occurences in the history of cosmology. 
Inverting the famous remark of George Santayana, one may say that those who relive the past 
thus betray their lack of historical knowledge.  
First of all, the broad optimistic expectations of proponents of CMB experiments are 
not alone in the entire spectrum of physical sciences in comparing the relativistic cosmology 
with our contemporary models in particle physics. Let us mention here just one famous 
example. According to the amusing, but remarkable, classification of Penrose (1989, p. 152), 
our theories in natural sciences may be divided into three broad categories of SUPERB, 
USEFUL and TENTATIVE. While the Big Bang cosmology is put by Penrose into category 
of USEFUL theories, so is the Standard Model of particle physics (that is, its two main 
constituents, the quark model and the electroweak theory of Glashow, Salam and Weinberg)! 
Therefore, the statement of Hu et al. (1997) can hardly be regarded as something outlandish 
and senseless, as Disney would have us believe.  
There is, however, a very significant and important point that Disney's and similar 
criticisms are signposts of. It may be explicated as insufficient attention devoted to 
epistemological and other philosophical aspects of modern cosmology, as compared, for 
instance to biological sciences or quantum mechanics. In particular, when the rate of growth 
of knowledge is taken into account, it is clear that philosophical foundations of modern 
cosmology are still very inadequate, its textbook framework often outdated or directly wrong, 
and misconceptions about it should not be surprising. This point (and further motivation for 
engaging in the present discussion) is described in wise words of Kragh (1997) that  
 
there is a tendency to streamline history and ignore the many false trails and 
blind alleys that may seem so irrelevant to the road that led to modern 
knowledge. It goes without saying that such streamlining is bad history and 
that its main function is to celebrate modern science rather than obtain an 
understanding of how science has really developed. The road to modern 
cosmology abounded with what can now be seen were false trails and blind 
alleys, but at the time were considered to be significant contributions.  
 
In reminding us of this lies the true value and importance of Disney's (2000) study.  
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2. Empirical basis of modern cosmology 
 
Disney lists 13 observations constituting, in his opinion, the entire empirical basis of 
cosmology (Table 1 of Disney 2000). There are several problems with this list. The most 
obvious one is the lack of several important observational data clearly relevant to cosmology. 
Lacking are, for instance, observations on the properties of galaxy clusters, especially those at 
high redshift, as well as appropriate Sunyaev-Zel'dovich effects (e.g. Sunyaev and Zeldovich 
1980).1 Those have already showed their potential to discriminate between various 
cosmological models, in particular to reject the class of steady-state models with continuous 
recycling of high-entropy matter (Peter Phillips, personal communication). Beside abundances 
of deuterium and helium cited, the abundance of lithium is also relevant to cosmology 
(Deliyannis and Demarque 1991; Deliyannis et al. 1994). However, the most glaring omission 
is the very existence of high-redshift objects, especially after the small revolution brough 
about by HDF and subsequent deep-field observations (e.g. Lanzetta, Yahil and Fernandez-
Soto 1996), which places significant constraints on the various cosmological models of 
structure formation. Among many important contributions in this field, it should not be 
forgotten that Disney himself has contributed much to our understanding of the high-redshift 
universe (e.g. Phillipps, Davies and Disney 1990). In addition, there are observations and 
results nominally belonging to other scientific disciplines which are obviously relevant to the 
modern cosmology. Notably, the existence of large-scale entropy gradient (“the arrow of 
time”) is one such part of empirical knowledge employed in cosmology2; other examples 
include flavors and masses of elementary particles, or observational indications (from studies 
of binary pulsars) for the existence of gravitational waves. If we should take some lessons 
from the developments in various physical sciences in last several decades, we should 
conclude that there can be no “appropriation” of empirical data: it is at least suspicious to say 
that—in the tight network of the present day research—piece of data A belongs to exclusively 
cosmology, piece B to (say) galactic dynamics, and piece C to particle physics.  
At several points, the Disney's discourse displays such implicit clear-cut distinction 
between cosmology and astrophysics. This in itself represents a claim very difficult to 
support. Where exactly is the boundary located? Does the formation of the large scale 
structure belong to the cosmological or “just” astrophysical domain? Formation of individual 
galaxies? Formation of the Milky Way? Numerical simulations which are criticized (and 
largely correctly so) by Disney do in fact deal with the hierarchical structure formation, the 
process which continues to this day (and thus, in principle, is observable)! If we discard the 
artificial boundary between cosmological and astrophysical domains, a whole new array of 
observational data becomes accessible and practically useful to cosmology. A nice example 
along this line of thought is the Gunn-Peterson test (in its various versions, both H I and He 
II), and the entire field of investigation of the early universe stemming from it (Gunn and 
Peterson 1965; Giallongo et al. 1994; Fang and Crotts 1995; Jakobsen 1997). By sharply 
delineating these fields, Disney used the opportunity to discard such (sometimes 
magnificently precise) observations and reduce the relevant list of empirical data. Obviously, 
this procedure is biased, to say at least.  
Some items on the Disney's list are marked as “serendipitous”, and in several other 
instance in the article is such serendipitous nature of many cosmological discoveries 
                                                
1
 The latter may be said to be included in “measured fluctuations in CBR”. However, the question mark added 
suggests that the author intends to cite intrinsic fluctuations.  
2
 That this is a cosmological datum was clear to Boltzmann and Zermelo at the end of XIX century. See, for 
instance, a vivid account of their polemic in Steckline (1983). Modern accounts of this all-important issue can be 
found in Zeh (1992) and Price (1996).  
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emphasized as if this somehow constitutes an argument against cosmology. We fail to see 
how this factographic background can be construed as derogatory. The history of all scientific 
disciplines is full of serendipitous discoveries, from the radioactivity to QSOs. If one wishes 
to be biased in this manner, one may also construe all the results following from such random 
occurences as comets and supernovae as serendipitous and somehow of lesser significance, 
since no amount of systematic effort (or “good laboratory empiricism” or verificationism) will 
bring about, for instance, SN 1987A. Therefore, such labelling is truly irrelevant to the issue 
whether cosmology is a proper science or not, or whether its database is big or small.  
The fact that observations are different from experiments is rather well-known and 
hardly deserves much dwelling upon. However, on the basis of this distinction one can hardly 
discard observational disciplines as unscientific. It seems that Disney would not have felt so 
uncomfortable if somebody has published opinion similar to the one by Hu et al. (1997) that 
after we launch the next generation of interplanetary spacecraft “we shall know more about 
satellites of Jupiter than about quarks”, in spite of the obvious fact that our entire corpus of 
knowledge on the Jovian system is of observational nature. The difference between this 
knowledge and the contemporary cosmological knowledge, therefore, is mostly psychological 
in nature. On the other hand, it is highly overblown to claim that the Standard Model of 
particle physics is based upon “thousands of experiments”. Even if one can count thousands 
of individual experiments (which is unlikely to be possible without massive historical 
research, not supported in Disney's article), it only means that all historical observations of, 
say, CMB should be counted (and there are certainly “dozens” if not “hundreds” of them). In 
particular, since we should count the arrow of time as a cosmological datum, the way of 
comparison of disciplines implied by Disney is reduced to absurd, since one may say that 
there are literally billions of pieces of empirical data relevant to cosmology. The real question 
is, on the other hand, how many different kinds of experiments or observations may 
independently be checked against existing theoretical models. And when the situation is 
considered in this light, one may see that the situation in the contemporary particle physics is 
not much better than in the contemporary cosmology (or in any other frontier discipline of 
science as well), and that it closely corresponds to the Penrose's classification, rather than the 
view presented by Disney.   
Finally, there is a point of practical significance in the years to come. It does not seem 
fair (if not outrightly hypocritical), to complain of the small cosmological database, 
simultaneously shooting poisoned arrows at that part of the cosmological community 
attempting to motivate the Next Generation Space Telescope. It is strange to expect that we 
may be ever “confident of converging on 'the truth'” and still profess knowledge of the history 
of science. There has been no such epistemological “convergence” in history; it was always 
just hard searching.  
 
 
 
3. Epistemological fallacies in criticism of cosmology 
 
What does motivate the strange (but, as we shall see in the next section, rather old-
fashioned) pronouncement that “this fascinating subject... is not a proper science at all”? This 
claim is repeated at least three times in the course of rather short Disney’s article. In light of 
the seriousness of this charge and its implication to both academic life and teaching science, 
its all aspects should be investigated in as much detail as possible.  
“There is only one Universe!”, exclaims Disney. Although this can also be regarded as 
an article of faith (and there are some reasons in modern quantum cosmology to believe 
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otherwise), let us accept it for a moment and take a look at its epistemological consequences. 
In several instances, Disney suggests that the status of cosmology as a science is somehow 
jeopardized by the fact that there is only a single universe. Per analogiam, it is highly 
uncertain whether evolutionary biology is a science (there has been only one, unrepeatable 
evolution of terrestrial biosphere), whether history is a science (unrepeatable sequence of 
historical events), whether geology is a science (only one Earth!), whether archaeology is a 
science (only a single array of material traces of ancient cultures), etc. However, if we are 
more open-minded, especially in the spirit of Sir Karl Popper's quotation from the beginning 
of the present paper, we shall realize that it is quite a common situation in science. Even more 
suspicious is the following locution: 
 
At a stroke this removes from our armoury all the statistical tools that have 
proved indispensable for understanding most of astronomy. 
 
A man in the street, not knowing anything about cosmology, could think (after reading 
Disney's verdict) that there is no statistics in cosmology. This is simply wrong. There are 
dozens of instances (from N-body simulations of structure formation, to the statistics of 
clusters and voids, to the CMB peaks) of usage of both statistical apparatus and the statistical 
mode of thinking in modern cosmology. Disney's remark is simply off the mark. The fact that 
one can not empirically investigate ensemble of universes is in itself an empirical fact and 
presents a part of our knowledge which we take into account in all cosmological 
considerations. It is not something extraneous which cosmologists simply ignore.  
Further remarks pertain to extrapolations required by the cosmological discourse. This 
is a celebrated issue, which has worried cosmologists from the beginning of this century. It 
has, on the historical side, represented one of the major motivations for building the steady-
state cosmological model, especially in the version of Bondi and Gold (1948). Many physical 
and philosophical discussions have taken place since that time, and many important issues 
have been cleared. However, it still worries people, as testified by Disney, who writes: 
 
Cosmology requires us to extrapolate what physics we know over huge 
ranges in space and time, where such extrapolations have rarely, if ever, 
worked in physics before. Take gravitation for instance. When we 
extrapolate the Inverse Square Law... from the solar system where it was 
established, out to galaxies and clusters of galaxies, it simply never works. 
We cover up this scandal by professing to believe in “Dark Matter” – for 
which as much independent evidence exists as for the Emperor's New 
Clothes. 
 
It needs to be noticed that statements like this hardly testify on the pretended “understanding 
of history”, since situation similar to the one described (in rather strong terms) is often a 
common working situation in science. Let us take an example exactly from particle physics, 
which Disney implies to be a real, mature and serious scientific discipline. At any time 
between cca. 1930. and 1960. a Disney-like sceptic could write a damaging paper against the 
nascent particle physics containing the following locution: 
 
Particle physics requires us to extrapolate what physics we know over 
minuscule ranges in space and time, where such extrapolations have rarely, 
if ever, worked in physics before. Take conservation laws for instance. 
When we extrapolate the laws of energy and momentum conservation... 
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from the mechanics and thermodynamics where they were established, 
down to the world of radioactivity and in particular the ubiquitous beta-
decay, they simply never work. We cover up this scandal by professing to 
believe in “neutrinos” – for which as much independent evidence exists as 
for the Emperor's New Clothes.  
 
Although a further elaboration of the analogy is hardly necessary, one should repeat here that 
whoever preaches humility should first realize its complete implications. It is with utmost 
pretentiousness that one concludes that there should be no stable dark matter particles only 
because we haven't found positive evidence for one in a very, very tiny range of time, space 
and detectability characterizing our experimental devices. In addition, as Bondi (1962) 
correctly put it, “We know from many directions that it is a very dangerous principle to 
suppose that anything we have in physics holds with arbitrary accuracy.” 
We find ourselves in similar position regarding complaints such as: 
 
Objects at cosmologically interesting distance are exceedingly faint, small 
and heavily affected by factors such as redshift-dimming and K-corrections, 
so it will obviously be very difficult, if not impossible, to extract clear 
information about geometry, or evolution, or astrophysics – all of which are 
tangled up together.  
 
The factographic background of this statement is impeccable. However, exclusivity is the real 
issue here: the same may be said for almost any other frontier of science. How about 
 
Objects and events at scales characteristic for grand unified theories are too 
tiny, too fuzzy, too rare and too difficult to interpret, being affected by 
uncertainties in cross-sections, rare decays, ... so it obviously will be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to extract clear information about physics at 
those scales.  
 
Now, it is interesting that the very terminology and the very reasons Disney lists (redshift-
dimming, K-corrections, etc.) are inseparable parts of the cosmological repertoire! In other 
words, only by improving our cosmological knowledge we may improve the database, which 
is, of course, quite normal self-correcting procedure in all scientific disciplines. there is no 
peculiarity of cosmological epistemology in this regard.  
Interestingly enough, Disney sees “very little evidence” to support, among others, the 
assumption that the portion of the universe susceptible to observations is representative of the 
cosmos as a whole. But this is the central thesis of the entire Copernican revolution, and 
whoever doubts it may as well affirm Aristotelian belief in immutable heavens (cf. the 
discussion of Dingle's criticisms below)! This can hardly be called “luck” as Disney tends to 
do. Together with other assumptions which Disney attaches to cosmology (and which are 
highly controversial from the beginning to the end), this is intended to show that cosmology is 
very limited discipline. However, a little bit of careful thinking would indicate that similar set 
of assumptions can as well be applied to particle physics or genetics or indeed any other 
modern, rapidly advancing field. Moreover, some modern concepts, like the anthropic 
principle and various inflationary scenarios, do come very close to relaxing this assumption. 
There are almost self-evident reasons, embodied in the Weak Anthropic Principle, as defined 
by Carter (1974), why we do expect to see the universe severely limited by restriction 
imposed by our very existence; it is completely different and very intriguing question (which 
 7 
is certainly beyond the scope of the present article) what physical agencies of such fine-tuning 
may be, although here also intriguing hypotheses are not lacking (e.g. Smolin 1992).  
The complexity issue is also necessary to tackle here, since it occupies a prominent 
position among Disney’s criticisms. “The optimistic cosmologist can always counter argue (I 
don’t know how) that the Universe in the large is a great deal simpler than its constituent 
parts.“ Historically speaking, it is in fact very easy to argue in that direction. It is clear that the 
structure of atom, with a nucleus regarded as a point of given mass and charge, is sufficient to 
explain all phenomena in atomic physics, chemistry, thermodynamics, etc. On the other hand, 
this simplification is not warranted on a deeper level, dictated by quantum mechanics. A 
simple historical study of Dalton's chemistry vs. Mendeleev's chemistry vs. London's 
chemistry will show that. In non-linear systems, such as our universe certainly is, the 
phenomenon that “the whole is less than its parts” is quite a common feature. Even in 
simplest mathematics, there are countless such cases. Stock examples include the uniform 
probability distribution: a specification of a real point and corresponding value of probability 
requires an infinite amount of information. At least one prominent author (Tegmark 1996) has 
argued on that basis that the entire universe (or, more to the point, multiverse) is built in the 
same way: with negligible total algorithmic informational content, and all apparent 
information contained in, say, our astronomical catalogues, being just a illusion due to the 
decoherence. 
Many of these issues have been answered, among others, by Sir Hermann Bondi in his 
illuminating Halley Lecture (Bondi 1962), as well as in a later booklet (Bondi 1967). In a 
lively and colorful discourse, Bondi stated, in connection with the relationship of Michelson-
Morley experiment, aether and the Special Theory of Relativity: 
 
Naturally, this is an example where you see, with a great deal of hindsight, 
how much simpler it would have been to have thought the matter through 
first instead of performing the experiment, but this naturally is a totally 
unhistorical approach. We can think it through so simply now and come to 
such a clear cut result, because our habits of thought have been formed by 
the insight due to this experiment. This has been, and is, a very valid 
criticism of every approach in which we try to account for complicated 
features of our environment found, often with great difficulty, by 
experimental methods, in terms of some quite simple and elementary fact 
which we then think through to its bitter conclusion, and scientists, rightly, 
are always very suspicious of hindsight... It is a good thing to consider as far 
as we can, which is usually not very far, the various possibilities, so that at 
least we can try to formulate crucial questions.  
 
This applies as well to Hu et al.'s and Disney's comparison of cosmology and particle physics. 
For other issues of epistemological relevance, we direct the reader to Bondi (1967) booklet, 
since it would be too straightforward to list the relevant arguments here.  
Finally, we have those issues in Disney's critique which are basically sociological in 
nature and thus are irrelevant for the criticism of cosmology per se. This applies, for instance, 
to the complaints that cosmology is “unhealthily self-referencing”, repetitive and devoid of 
genuine scientific debate. It is extremely doubtful whether there is any discipline in modern 
sciences to which such problematic attributes can not be assigned after some selective 
research. What about much discussed particle physics, whose obvious successes justify its 
choice as a standard for physical sciences? Is the “dogma” of Cold Dark Matter any worse 
than the “dogma” of Grand Unified Theory or even something called The Theory of 
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Everything (which is firmly supposed to exist, but there is not a trace of agreement what it 
should look like, how many free parameters contain, on what energies, etc.)? And what about 
all myriads of predicted particles, all those axions, photinos, gravitinos, arions, sneutrinos, 
various Higgs' particles, etc. about which countless papers, books and dissertations have been 
written without any empirical support whatsoever—but very thick (“self”, and of necessity) 
referencing? The true problem does not lie in cosmology; it is, if anywhere, in the heart of 
modern understanding of science, together with citation impacts, tenure-hunting and other 
parafernalia which form a legitimate subject for a critical sociology of science—but we 
certainly can not enter into that area here.  
 
 
 
 
4. Laudatores Temporis Acti: good old cosmology bashing 
 
In his famous Book of Imaginary Beings, Jorge Luis Borges describes a sect or group 
of people devoted to celebrating and re-living the past, appropriately called Laudatores 
Temporis Acti (Borges 1970). Borges himself judges their belief as senseless and 
unproductive. The same may be said for a long-standing tradition of criticism of scientific 
nature and epistemological grounding of cosmology. If history bears any relevance, than such 
attacks can not result in any advance of our knowledge.  
Since Disney listed among cosmology's failures pre-physical, that is, religious 
cosmologies of the ancient times, it would only be just to reply with the historical fact that 
essentially cosmological issues (of course, non-orthodox) were among the most repressed 
scientific achievements, in particular in Europe during the Middle Ages and the Rennaisance. 
Wasn't Bruno burnt at stake exactly for proposing a dissenting cosmological view (of the 
plurality of worlds)? The repression of ecclestiacal authorities against the cosmological 
revolution of the XVI and early XVII century is a well-known story. However, since we 
maintain that the true subject of inquiry should be only physical cosmology, we should 
consider only criticisms arising within that framework (that is, since 1916. and the advance of 
General relativity).  
Thus Bishop Barnes, one of the most distinguished natural philosophers in the first 
several decades of XX century wrote that the Lemaitre's “primeval atom” hypothesis (that is, 
the first Big Bang cosmology as understood today) is “a brilliantly clever jeu d'esprit rather 
than a sober reconstruction of the beginning of the world” (Barnes 1933). Obviously, to this 
statement, written in 1933, Disney and other modern detractors of cosmology may fully 
subscribe.  
Historically the most interesting attacks on cosmology came during the two debates, in 
late 1930-ies and in 1950-ies, initiated by Herbert Dingle. In the first wave of attack, Dingle 
(1937a,b) criticized cosmological theories of Eddington, Milne and Dirac, which enjoyed 
rather great popularity and publicity in these days (which is testified by replies ot Dingle's 
papers in the Letters section of Nature, among others by Whitrow, McCrea, Haldane and C. 
G. Darwin). The essence of his attack was that those cosmologists (although they have not 
been labeled as such at the time) perverted empirical basis of natural sciences, being too 
rationalistic, extravagant and even mysticism-prone. In a pejorative sense, he etiquetted his 
targets even in the very title of his article as “modern Aristotelians” and accused them of 
pseudo-religious “cosmolatry” (compare Disney's dictum that “the most unhealthy aspect of 
cosmology is its unspoken parallel with religion“!). Ironically enough, Dingle censures 
Eddington for believing that the cosmological constant Λ is of fundamental importance in 
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nature, the belief that has been largely vindicated in recent years (cf. Krauss and Turner 
1999). Basic thrust of his attack was the same as Disney’s: cosmological theories are 
speculative, empirically unsupported and highly dogmatic.   
In the next round of his battle with cosmology, a decade and a half later, Dingle 
discovered new and more modern (as well as dangerous) targets: the steady-state 
cosmologists, mainly Bondi and Hoyle (Dingle 1953, 1956). Incidentally, they were targets of 
the criticisms of most of the mainstream cosmologists, but mainly for reasons entirely 
different from Dingle's (Kragh 1996). The general tone of Dingle's criticism in 1950-ies was 
the same as in 1930-ies: cosmology is not a true science, it can not be found on any general 
principle, only inductive results are permissible, empiricism is the correct scientific attitude, 
everything else is Aristotelianism and religion. It goes without saying that Dingle rejected the 
relativistic cosmology (i.e. all Big Bang models) for these same reasons, although, obviously, 
the steady-state camp was an easier target.   
It is not necessary to emphasize that the Dingle's criticisms were, although certainly 
well-intentioned, unfair and far off the mark; they share both properties with the Disney's 
critique. Theories like Dirac's, Milne's and the steady-state were certainly not mystic nor 
extravagant; the former is applicable rather to their opponents, and the latter is not something 
which can be objectively determined, but rather the issue of habits and fashion. Narrow 
inductivism and a particularly strong and unproductive version of verificationism underlie all 
such attacks and transform them into a sort of ignorabimus-festival.3 The plain fact that our 
knowledge is often unreliable does not provide, in itself, the ever-lasting topic for productive 
discussion. The best general medicine in these cases is the very history of science. It is 
enough to ask: could we obtain great, successful, uncontroversial scientific theories by such 
strait and inflexible approach? Are epistemological bases of, say, Darwin's theory of 
evolution, Maxwell's electrodynamics or Einstein's General relativity compatible with 
extreme inductivism and verificationism advocated by Dingle and Disney? The answer seems 
obviously negative. The accusation of “cosmolatry” is difficult to answer, being so subjective 
and emotionally-charged. In any case, it seems possible to find pathologies in worshipping of 
experiment and empirical knowledge as well.    
Similar criticisms have been repeated almost verbatim in the Western world by 
Munitz, Bunge, Zwicky, Scriven and other authors (interestingly enough, mainly philosophers 
of science, or observational astronomers with philosophical ambitions, like Zwicky). 
Simultaneously, the basically same issues have served as ready ammunition for Stalinist 
attacks on cosmology (probably the second most repressed scientific discipline in the former 
Soviet empire after genetics), which have taken place all over the Marxist-dominated world. 
Particularly dangerous was the accusation that cosmology is either a scientific mask for 
religion, or itself is similar to religion, which could as well cost one one's life in those years. 
This displays crucial ideological tendency in the anti-cosmological viewpoint. A target for 
religious dogmatism and fanaticism in the Middle Ages, cosmology in the XX century has 
lived through a monstrous history of totalitarian repression. In both German Nazism and 
Soviet Marxism, it was a science beyond the pale, with all appropriate and largely tragic 
consequences. The most sordid example of that disgusting history is the heinous murder of 
Matvei Bronshtein in 1938. by Soviet socialists under some nonsensical pretext. Is that just a 
coincidence, or there is something deeply human and liberating in the cosmological endevoar 
per se, something which necessarily disturbs all totalitarian, closed-minded and self-centered 
worldviews? 
 
                                                
3
 Quite apart from the plain fact that Aristotle himself has been rather empirically minded philosopher/scientist. 
He was much more empirically oriented than, say, Descartes, Newton or Kepler.  
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5. Conclusion: patient alive and well 
 
What else is there in the Disney's criticism apart from issues we have addressed here 
and some strong-worded rethorics? Rutherford's dictum quoted (“don’t let me hear anyone 
use the word 'Universe' in my department”) testifies only on regrettable closed-mindedness, 
authoritarianism and arrogance to which some directors and managers are sometimes prone. 
Comparisons with religion abound, but—as we have seen in the previous section—they are 
not new, and seem to be rather ill motivated (“rapt audience, the media exposure, the big 
book-sale”, as if an element of jealousy is not entirely absent). It is, in absence of precise 
sociological studies, rather questionable that cosmology receives more attention from non-
scientists than do other astronomical disciplines or sciences in general, for instance planetary 
sciences or searching for extraterrestrial life or genetic engineering. But it is one thing to 
criticize a phenomenon like the perceived media attention; it is much more sinister to suggest 
that “for that reason alone [underlined by M. M. Ć.] other scientists simply must treat the 
pretensions of cosmology... with heightened scepticism.” We fail to see the causal connection 
here. While reiterating the necessity of scepticism under any circumstances, the criterion of 
Disney is simply devoid of rational grounds. Per analogiam, one expects that such disciplines 
as computer science, astronautics or genetics should be treated with heightened scepticism 
because they are in the focus of public attention in recent years (and, parenthetically, much 
more so than cosmology). Besides, it is rather uncertain what does this “heightened 
skepticism” really mean. Does this mean that professional journals in genetics should have 
systematically more referees than journals in botanic? Or that sales of books in artificial 
intelligence or cosmology ought to be administratively limited?  
 Finally, the message to the general public which the discussed article suggests has 
some elements of a tautology. The points that our theories are changeable and replaceable is 
nothing new or particularly interesting. However, minor slips of dogmatism are present here 
also (e.g. “the architecture and history of infinity” [underlined by M. M. Ć.]).   
 In conclusion, the return of critiques of cosmology on the broadest basis is an 
interesting phenomenon for the sociologists and philosophers of science, but does not present 
anything new or constructive in physical sense. Such critiques are partially unfair and highly 
selective, as we have shown above. The most serious problem with such critiques lies, in the 
opinion of the present author, in the absence of originality. At the close of the century and the 
millenium, one may conclude that the attacks did not inflict much damage, since cosmology 
as the scientific practice is livelier than ever. However, it tells something on the lack of new 
motivation and ideas on the part of the detractors.  
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